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DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON
RACE AND THE SCHOOLS. By Lino A. Graglia.* Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1976. Pp. 351. Clothbound SI1.50. Reviewed by
Michael J. Perry.**
Professor Graglia is extremely unhappy, even bitter, about the
state of the law of school desegregation. His book makes that quite
clear.
Disaster by Decree is a critical analysis of the major Supreme
Court school desegregation opinions and of several important lower
federal court opinions as well. Professor Graglia proceeds chronologi-
cally, beginning principally with Brown v. Board of Education (Brown
I)1 and ending with Milliken v. Bradley.2  Most of the ground he
covers is by now surely familiar, at least to students of constitutional
law. For example, Graglia faults the Supreme Court's misplaced
reliance on social science data in Brown ,3 its misguided foot-
dragging ("with all deliberate speed") in Brown 11,4 and the Court's
failure to face forthrightly the important, fundamental distinction be-
tween prohibiting segregated schooling-Le., schooling in which stu-
dents are purposely separated on the basis of race-and requiring racially
balanced schooling. 5  The road from Brown I to Milliken makes for
fascinating storytelling, especially for those interested in the relation-
ship between constitutional law and politics.
Graglia's basic complaint is that the court opinions he dissects
have been inept or, less charitably, dishonest. On this point he is
surely right. In Brown I the Supreme Court ruled that the use of
race as a criterion of selection in order to segregate violates the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.6  But what federal
constitutional law has come to require now, in most circuits,7 is the
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1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
3. L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE 26-30 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as GRAGLI A].
This point is also suggested in P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITTTrONAL DECISIONMAKIMG 942-
53 (1975).
4. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), discussed in GRAGLIA, supra note 3, at 33-45.
5. Eg., GRAGLIA, supra note 3, at 203-57.
6. Although the Supreme Court's opinion in Brown I did not make this ruling clear. sub-
sequent per curiam opinions citing Brown I did so. See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improve-
ment Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks); Gayle v. Browder, 350 U.S. 903 (1956)
(buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v.
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380. 388 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530, 537 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975);
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use of a racial classification in order to increase racial balance in
the classroom. This affirmative requirement of increased racial balance,
contrary to the assertions of the court opinions, is neither an applica-
tion nor a simple extension of Brown I. As Graglia argues through-
out, the requirement of racial balance is different toto caelo from the
negative prohibition of the use of a racial criterion to segregate.
In order to comply with the principle of Brown I a school board need
only cease using a racial criterion to segregate. But to comply with
the requirement of racial balance the board must assign students to
schools on the basis of race. Frequently, the requirement of racial
balance is advertised as remedial only, an obligation to undo the
present effects of past school segregation. But, as Graglia-like others,
including Justice Powell'-points out, racially imbalanced classrooms
today are less the result of past school segregation than the reflection
of pervasive residential racial isolation. Indeed, racially imbalanced
classrooms are a derivative problem; the more fundamental, and in-
tractable, problem is residential racial isolation. 9
It is one thing to criticize a constitutional case or line of cases by
taking issue with a court's reasoning. It is quite another thing to
suggest that no reasoning-neither the court's nor an), imaginable
reasoning-can justify the result reached. Although Graglia effectively
criticizes the reasoning of the major school desegregation opinions,
his higher aim is to demonstrate that no reasoning can justify the
requirement of increased racial balance, that the requirement is wholly
illegitimate. Disaster by Decree falls short of that aim.
The requirement of racial balance, Graglia contends, is counter-
productive; it serves only to increase racial imbalance in the school
by causing "white flight" and to exacerbate racial hostilities.'0 How-
ever, there is reputable evidence to the contrary. First, a report of
the United States Commission on Civil Rights released in August
19761 concludes that school desegregation cannot be held wholly or
even primarily responsible for the exodus of whites from the cities
Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 54 (2d Cir. 1975); Morgan v. Kerrigan,
509 F.2d 580, 593 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Oliver v, Michigan State
Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 181 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). But se
Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 500 F.2d 349, 352 (9th Cir. 1974). See g!nerall
Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA, L. RLv. 540.
578-80 (1977).
8. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 222-23 (1973) (Powell. J.. concurring in
result).
9. For discussion of this point, see TRB: Blacks and Whites. Tnt NEw RiPtUBtlic,
April 10, 1976, at 2.
10. Graglia's several points against the requirement of racial balance appear mainly in
his concluding chapter. GRAGLIA, supra note 3, at 258-83.
11. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FULFILLINO TiL LETTER ANt' SPIRr
OF THE LAW: DESEGREGATION OF THE NATION'S PUBLIC SClOOLS (1976) [hereinafter cited as
DESEGREGATION REPORT].
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that has been taking place since the end of World War 11.12 More-
over, given the pervasive reality of residential racial isolation, the ab-
sence of a requirement of increased racial balance would mean, in
urban centers, at least, all-white or all-black student populations. Thus,
it is difficult to understand how the requirement of racial balance has
substantially increased the racial imbalance that would otherwise exist
in the classrooms. Second, in the opinion of the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights, the extent to which school desegregation (and busing)
exacerbate hostilities is linked to the extent to which community lead-
ers encourage resistance to court-ordered desegregation.13  The Com-
mission's August 1976 report suggests that desegregation generally
proceeds smoothly and peacefully where community leaders so wish.
Another basic point Graglia directs against the requirement of
racial balance is that greater racial balance in the classroom, contrary
to the hopes of many, has not materially improved the academic
achievement of minority students. It may be too soon to tell. None-
theless, the notion that greater racial balance improves minority aca-
demic achievement is, at this point at least, a dangerously weak reed
on which to place the requirement of racial balance.
t4
The fundamental justification for increased racial balance is also
the most obvious: interracial associations in the schools, especially
among young children, can go a long way toward undermining the
prejudices and stereotypes that are the heart of racial intolerance.
We do not need a social scientist to tell us that prejudice is the child
mainly of ignorance. Graglia cites a study suggesting that com-
pulsory integration heightens racial consciousness and "enhances
ideologies that promote racial segregation." 5 Surely it is to be ex-
pected that in the beginning compulsory integration will breed resis-
tance and self-defensive insularity, at least among older students and
parents.16  However, in the long run this resistance and insularity-
born largely of fear-may be reasonably expected to yield to accep-
tance and, beyond that, to understanding, 7 unless the flames of racial
12. Id. at 161. See Wicker, The AMyth of Busing: Some Contradictory Evidence. N.Y.
Times, September 19, 1976, sec. 4, at 15, col. 5.
13. DESEGREGATION REPORT, supra note 11, at 92-100, 155-56; see Rights Panel Is Critical or
Ford on Schools, N.Y. Times, August 29, 1976, sec. 4, at 4, col. I.
14. See Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 307-310 (1972).
15. GRAGLIA, supra note 3, at 276 (citing Armor, The Evidence on Busing. Tie Pt'ULC
INTEREST, No. 28, at 90, 102 (Summer 1972)).
16. Cf. T. CorsTL, BUSING (1976) (reporting conversations with various Boston residents
personally affected by court-ordered busing in that city).
17. See DESEGREGATION REPORT, supra note II, at 138-42. For authorities emphasizing the
importance of interracial association in the classroom in laying a groundwork for interracial
harmony in society, see Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 699, 729-32
(E.D.N.Y. 1974), afl'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401. 419,
504 (D.D.C. 1967), afi'd sub nona. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); U'iTrED
STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN TIlE PUBLIC SCuHOOLS 109-10
1977]
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prejudice are insistently flamed by community leaders and opportunis-
tic politicians. 8
Even if one assumes that racial balance in the classroom lays the
groundwork for subsequent interracial tolerance and understanding,
a basic issue remains: by what warrant does the federal judiciary,
principally the Supreme Court, impose this requirement in the name
of the Constitution?19 Professor Graglia does not speak to this issue
-the role of the judiciary in American government-except in simplistic
terms that disserve his cause. For example, in a hyperbolic rather
than reflective spirit, Graglia accuses the Supreme Court and certain
lower federal courts of "lawless tyranny,"20 of "unrestrained tyran-
ny, 21  and of "essentially lawless" action.22  Professor Graglia's
critique of the school desegregation cases is far from the careful,
deliberate study of the role of the judiciary in American government
that it might have been and, indeed, sought to be.23 To paraphrase
Pascal, a scholarly work does not show greatness by being at one
24extremity, but by touching both at once.
Relatedly, Professor Graglia suggests that although the principle
of Brown I-the prohibition of the use of racial criteria to segregate-is
ethically unassailable, there is a serious question whether the Supreme
Court, because it is unelected and thus politically unaccountable,
should have imposed the principle on the political processes:
[l]t is hardly possible to quarrel with the Brown decision-as distinct from
the opinion-except on the ground that so important a social change
should not have been made by unelected, lifetime appointees. The
Brown case was less a traditional law suit than a call for a social revolu-
tion, and in a healthy democracy social revolutions are made by elected
representatives authorized to effectuate their political views and account-
able for the results.
25
To this reviewer a basic function of the Supreme Court in constitu-
(1967); Emerson, Frank, Frey, Griswold, Hale, Havinghurst and Levi, Brief for the Conmnittee
of Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education, 34 MINN. L. REv. 289, 319-20 (1Q50),
18. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
19. Actually, the Supreme Court has not imposed this rcqvirement in so many words, It
has, however, declined to review several lower court cases thzt have done so. See note 7
supra. But cf Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 96 S. Ct. 2697 (1976) (district court order
requiring reassignment of students to compensate for changing demographic patterns held
abuse of discretion); Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976) (employment practice having
disproportionate racial impact held not violative of equal protection clause of fifth amendment,
even though not "job-related," absent showing of "discriminatory purpose").
20. GRAGLIA, supra note 3, at 94.
21. Id. at 144.
22. Id. at 158.
23. Id. at 14.
24. "A man does not show his greatness by being at one extremity, but rather by touch-
ing both at once." Quoted in A. CAMuS, RESIsTANCE, REBELLION, AND DrATI I (Vintage
Books ed. 1974).
25. GRAGLIA, supra note 3, at 31-32. See id. at 258.
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tional cases is to act in accord with "basic shared national values"26
when other agencies of government have been unable or unwilling
to do so. A great virtue of the Court in this regard is precisely its
insulation frbm the exigencies and expediencies of practical politics."
The problem of race and the schools-particularly of busing to
achieve racial balance-is as complex as it is controversial. Professor
Graglia has ably demonstrated the various infirmities of the principal
court opinions on school desegregation. Regrettably, however, he has
failed to deal adequately with the subtleties of the larger issues he
addresses. In the end, Disaster by Decree, notwithstanding its care-
ful, sustained critique of judicial opinions, contributes little to our
comprehension of what must surely be one of the most perplexing
domestic problems of our time.28
26. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN,. L. REv. 703, 709 (1975).
27. This reviewer has discussed the role of the judiciary in constitutional adjudication
elsewhere. Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: 77te Ethical Function
of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 689 (1976). See also A. Cox, THlE ROLE OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1976).
28. For two recent works that contribute more substantially to our understanding of the
problem of race and the schools, see T. COTTLE, BUsiNG (1976), and SCHOOL DESEGREGT tO':
SHADOW AND SUBSTANCE (F. Levinson & B. Wright eds., 1976).
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